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Draft Recommendation
on security in a wider Europe 
- 
reply to lhe annual report ofthe Council
The Assembly',
(,) Welcoming the fact that rn rts Erfurt Dcclaratron the Council of WEU expressed the resolve to
take up the challenges arrsing out of thc implcmcntation of the Treatl' of Amstcrdam and the decisions
taken by NATO in Berhn and Madrid:
(,,) Strongll' regretting, however, that the Council of WEU did not submrt the second part of its
43rd annual report to thc Assembll, in ttme, yet agatn farhng to compll' u'ith its obhgations under
Article IX of the modified Brusscls Treaty,
ftrr) Decplv concerned about the continurng tense sltuatlon in Kosovo and the major drffrcultres
encountered in tn'rng to reach a solution satrsfactory to all the partles involved before these problems
pose a genuine threat to the securitv and stabrlity of the nerghbouring statcs of FYROM and Albania, as
rvell as to the Balkan regron as a u'hole,
0, Stressing thcrcfore thc importance of reachrng agreement raprdll' u'rthin the WEU Council on
drau'ing up a procedure facrlrtating consensus-burldrng and the cmergencc of a decision to act rn
response to a specific crisis. u'ithin the framervork of the relevant provrsrons of the modified Brusscls
Treaty', as agreed in Erfurt;
O Consrderrng that Europe ls more likeh' to rcact surftlv to crisrs srtuatrons if decisions taken by
the European Union to avarl rtself rn such cases of \\rEU are based from the outset on relevant
prehminary rvork and proposals bv WEU.
(u,) Notrng that at lcast one WEU member state 
- 
Germanr' 
- 
rs of the opinron that the amcndment
to the Treaty on European Unron adopted rn Amsterdam entails a consequcnt amcndment to the
modrfied Brussels Treatl', u'hrch was approved bi'its natronal parliamcnt u'hen rt ratrficd Article l7 of
the Treat,v on European Unron. u'hereas the Councrl of WEU. rn rts rcpll'to Recommendatron 618,
explicitll' stated that the development of relations u'rth the European Unron did not call for a revrsron of
thc modrfied Brussels Treaty,
(wr) Drau'rng attention therefore to the danger of natronal parhaments adoptrng drverging
rntcrprelatrons of the legal consequences of the ratrficatron of Artrclc I7 of the Treaty on European
Unron,
(vitr) Hoprng that thc lntcntlon announced by thc European Unron rn thc Amsterdam Treaty of
devcloprng closer rnstrtutronal relatrons rvrth WEU urll lead to enhanced particrpation of all WEU
nations and organs rn the actrvrties of the CFSP,
(u) Stressrng the need to dcfine more clearll' than has hrtherto been the case the nature. framework
and oblectives of a European secuntv and defcnce rdentrtl' and the countnes that are to particrpate rn rt.
(x) Concemed that the Councrl's approach, u'hrch consrsts rn foundrng the arrangements for
enhanced partrcrpation b1' the associate membcrs, obscrvers and associatc partners on indrvrdual
dccisions, about u'hich the Assembll, rn somc cases ls not informed. urll lead to considerable legal
uncertaintv, wrth the rrsk that the rights of the parhamentan delegatrons of thesc states in the Assembly'
rvtll no longer be in line u'rth those en;oy,ed by their representatrvcs in the Councrl:
(n) Stressmg, thereforc, that all efforts designed to secure the enhanced participatron of these
countries in the activities of WEU can only be supported by' thc Assembh, if such partrcipatron is
founded on clear rnternatronal legal agreemcnts which are sub.;ect to parhamcntarl, scrutiny;
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(xit) Consrdering that the enlargement pnnciples set down by WEU member states in therr
Declaratron of December l99l have been overtaken by events and are urgently rn need of revision if
WEU rs to make a constructive contribution to buildrng a s'ider sccurrty and defence Europe,
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COI.INCIL
l. Inform the Assembly' of the legal consequences that the entry into force of the provrsrons of the
Amsterdam Treaty has for the modrfied Brussels Treaty, so that this may be taken into account durrng
the ratification procedure m the member states;
2 Take the necessary steps rvithout delay to ensure that those provrsrons of the modified Brussels
Treaty' that may' be affected by the amendments to the Treatl, on European Union are revised
accordingly,
3. Rapidly check rvhether any provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty need to be amended as a
result of the creation of military structures rvithin WEU;
4 Inform the Assembly of any progress madc towards improving the procedure for taking decisions
m crisrs situatrons,
5. Clarifu u'hether any'differences exist, and if so rdentifu them, betri'een the prolect of a European
security and defence identrtl, (ESDI) on the onc hand and the CFSP, or the common defence pohcy as
.1orntl1, defincd by WEU and the EU, on the other,
6 Make WEU's enlargement policl'suffrcientlv flexible so that:
(a) all states u,ith u'hich the European Union has started accessron ncgottations and u'hrch
have signed accession protocols ri'ith the Atlantic Alhance are invrted to accede to the modified
Brussels Treatf in condrtrons to bc agreed in accordance rvith the provrsrons of Artrcle XI of the
said Treaty;
(b) the minimum prerequisitc for the accession of European NATO member states to the
modrfied Brussels Treatf is acceptance of their partrcrpatron in the CFSP.
7 Accordrngll' take steps vrs-a-vrs the EU, wrthin the framework of thc arrangements on enhanced
cooperation bctu'een the EU and WEU to be agreed on the basrs of the Amsterdam Treatl', to secure the
partrcipation of thoseWEU assocrate members and assocrate partners rvho so desire m the actrvitres of
the CFSP rn so far as these concern WEU,
8. Invrte those assoclate members of WEU rvho so desrre to accede to the modrfied Brussels Treaty,
providcd that the condrtrons set out rn paragraphs 6(b) and 7 are fulfilled;
9. Ensure that cooperatron urth all WEU natrons rvhich are unable or unurlhng to accede to thc
modified Brussels Treatl' rn the forcseeable future rs founded on a lcgally clear rnternatronal agreement
of assocration, to be sublect to parliamentary scrutmy, that wrll render the current drstinctions betu'ecn
associate members, observers and associate partners superfluous,
t0 Convev to the Asscmbly the document approved in Erfurt on the practical arrangements for the
partrcipation ofassocrate partner states in Pctersberg operatrons.
I l. Ensure that in the future the annual report of the Council is alrval's submitted on trme to the
Assembly and that it contains informatron about the activrles of the Europcan Unton in the field of the
CFSP
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Exp lan atory M e mor andu m
(submitted by Mr Antretter, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
L 1997 u,as the year of important decrsions
for thc future of Europe's sccunt.v. The Amster-
dam Treatl' provrded the European Uruon wrth
additional possibilities and instruments for
drarving closer to its ob.lective of framrng a
genulne corrrmon foreign and secunty policl'
(CFSP) The Treag'madc clear that the proJect
of a common defence withrn the European Union,
and thereforc of the possrble rntegration of WEU
rn the EU, cannot be achreved for thc moment.
The prospect of thcse goals being attained in thc
future depends on a politrcal decisron of the
European Councrl that rs unhkely to be taken rn
the foreseeable future because of the contrnuing
drfferences ofoprnion on the subject
2 Thrs means that WEU rvrll continue to be
thc sole European defence organisation and the
only' European organisation capable of plannrng
and conductrng mrlitary operations for cnsis-
managcment purposes The Amsterdam Treatv
expressh' recognised WEU's rmportant rolc ln
thrs respect and gave the European Unron compe-
tence to avarl itself of WEU to that end rvhere
necessarv and to set it general politrcal gurdelincs
rn such cases The objectivc of building up WEU
ln stages as the EU's defence component rs to be
pursued through a series of concrcte measures
desrgned to strengthen mstrtutronal relations and
practrcal cooperation betu'ecn WEU and the
European Unron
3 The EU summit meetmg hcld on 12-13
Dccember 1997 paved the u'av for the first round
of negotiatrons on EU enlargement to take m
countrres to the east and south. The European
Unron's partnershrp agreement with Russia also
entered mto force in Dccember. The NATO
countries reached agreement that the European
security and defence identrtv should be burlt
rvithin thc Atlantic Alhance and recognised that
WEU rs an essentral part of the ESDI.
4. At the NATO summit meeting in Madnd
the ministers decrded to mvite three central Euro-
pean states 
- 
the Czech Republic, Hungan' and
Poland 
- 
to accede to the Washrngton Treaty m
the first w'al'e of enlargcment rvhrle makrng it
qurte clear that membershrp of the Alliance re-
marned open to other countrres at a later datc A
Foundrng Act u'as signed on relations behveen
NATO and Russia. At the same time. NATO and
Ukraine agrced on a mutual cooperation and
partnershrp chartcr. Thc North Atlantic Coop-
eratron Councrl was superseded by the Euro-
Atlantrc Partnership Councrl and the Partnershrp
for Peace prograrrrne r.r,as enhanced and ex-
tended Frnally,, rn a bilateral contcxt, the Unrted
States and thc Baltlc countrlcs concluded a
Charter ofPartncrship on l6 January 1998.
5 The WEU countries have draun the neces-
san' conclusrons from the decrsrons taken by the
European Union in Amsterdam and bv NATO in
Berhn. Smtra and Madrrd In the WEU Declara-
tron of 22 JuJy 1997 attached to the Final Act of
the rntergovernmental conference and in thc Er-
furt Declaratron of l8 November 1997 
^ 
the WEU
Councrl of Mrnistcrs attempted to define a ne\\-
role for WEU. It has also draun up a compre-
hensrve prograrnme of u'ork covenng closer co-
operatron rn the future betrvecn WEU and both
the European Union and NATO, WEU's opera-
tional dcvelopment, armaments cooperatton. re-
latrons u-rth thrrd countrres such as Russra.
Lkrarne and the Medrterranean states. and other
secuntv-related rssues Among other thrngs, the
WEU Councrl has taken a serres of decrsions on
hou' to improvc the rnvolvement of the assocrate
mcmber. observer and associate partncr countries
ln thc Organisation's activrtrcs.
6 In vreu, of all thesc developments. WEU rs
no\\' supposed to bc an organrsatron rvrth a
clearlv defined role Thc Amsterdam and Madrid
decrsrons put an end to the debate that had been
golng on for I'ears about its future as an rnstitu-
tionl
7 Horvever it u,ould appear to be lust as dif-
ficult as rn the past to persuade the public at
large of the relevance of WEU's role and rts
r wgU S...etary-General Cutrleiro addressing the
50th session of thc Instrtute for Advanced Natronal
Defence Studres, Brussels. on 2l Januan, I998.
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contrlbution to marntarnrng peacc and stability in
a u'rder Europc. Frfty' y'cars on from the signature
of the Brusscls Treat1,, u,hose modrfied vcrslon
created WEU 43 vears ago, therc are strll dtffcr-
ences of oprnlon and a lack of rnformation about
the Organrsatron's value and purpose. Thc day
after the Erfurt Dcclaratron was adopted, an ar-
trcle appeared in a German ne*spaper' contam-
rng the follori'ing comment:
"The British, French and Germans do not
have the samc view of what WEU should
become and drsagree as to u'hether it
should be the "militan, u'mg" of the Euro-
pean Union, a "bridge" betleen the EU
and NATO or merelv a forum in rvhich the
Europcan countrres of NATO can reach
agreement WEU's extended membership
makcs rt polrticallt'unmanageable and the
absence of anv mrlrtan, infrastructure ren-
ders rt unsuitable as an rnstrument for se-
curlt\'..."
8 Your Rapporteur does not endorsc thrs
blanket cntrcrsm Rather, he shares the l,rcrv the
German Forergn Mrnrster, Mr Krnkel, exprcssed
rn hrs address to the Assembll, of WEU on
I Decembcr 1997 rihen he sard that it u'as to be
hoped that WEU u'ould havc ven' fen' occasions
u'hen rt u'ould havc to provc rts surtabrlrtv as an
rnstrumcnt for European cnsls managcment The
crucral rssue ls u'hether the countrrcs concerned
can gcnerate the common polrtrcal urll in a crisis
that u'rll enablc them to have recoursc to WEU
for thc purposc of managrng it Becausc of thc
rnterlockrng nature of the rclatrons that notv cxrst
betuccn the European Union, WEU and NATO.
the requisrte corrrmon u'rll must be present rn all
three organrsatrons rf WEU rs to be asked to in-
teryene
9 Irrcspcctive of WEU's succcssful partrcr-
patron ln monrtorlng thc embargo rmposed rn the
Adnatrc and on the Danube and rts pohce mis-
slon ln Mostar. there are a number of other cx-
amples that shou'hou' drfficult it is ri'rthin WEU
to securc agreement on polrtical action Onc can
mentron thc begrnnrngs of the conflrct rn former
Yugoslavra. the qucstron of a peacekecprng force
rn the Afrrcan Grcat Lakes rcgron or the crisis m
Albanra u'here WEU's contnbution rs hmrted to
\;r*rt 1*trr .-lllgentetne Zettung, l9 Novembcr
t991
a remlt for the multmatronal advisorv pohce elc-
ment (MAPE) It rs also pcrtinent to ask u'hether
WEU actually' trred to address the issue of adopt-
lng a common European stance on the latest Iraqr
crisrs, and finally, u'hethcr the onlv action WEU
can take on the situatron rn Kosol,o rs a short
statement by rts Secretary-General
10. Furthermore, greater use of WEU than in
the past should also be made in other problem
areas concerning wrder European secuntv It has
correctlv been sard that WEU's present famrly of
28 countnes rs the precursor of tomorrow's
Europe. The first ob.;ective of this report rs to
point to the European security issues that are strll
outstandmg and that morc than ever before the
European governments need to address b1, having
rccourse to thc possrbrlitics offered b1, WEU In
thrs context refcrence can be made to u'ork on thc
European secuntl' and dcfence idcntrtv (ESDI)
and the unsolved problcm of hou' to ensure that
the enlargemcnt strategics of the European Unron
and NATO arc congruent.
I L In preparrng thrs report the Rapportcur
held consultatrons rr'rth represcntatrves of the
governments. parhamcnts and pohtrcal parties of
a number of WEU natrons. rncluding Greece,
Turkel'. Poland. Slovakra and Austrra, u'ho pro-
vtded extremelv useful input and suggestrons for
the final versron of thc document. Thc Rap-
porteur has made evcr-r' effort to take on board
the u'ealth of comments madc by' membcrs u'ho
attended the meeting of thc Polrtrcal Commrftee
rn Washrngton on 2.1 March 1998, at u,hrch the
irutral u'orkrng paper u'as drscussed at lcngth
II. The na, dimension
of the modified Brussels Treaty
12 In asscssrng WEU's future contrrbutron to
sccunh' rn a s.rder Europe, threc factors should
be taken rnto consrderatlon rn his address to the
WEU Assembly on I December 1997. the then
Chairman-rn-Office of the Councrl referred to
WEU as a "multr-purpose instrument" Thrs is
indeed an appropnatc term that corresponds to
the extensive responsrbilrtres conferrcd upon
WEU br the modrfied Brusscls Trcat1,. In this
context rt rs gratrf\,ing that the WEU mrnrsters
agreed rn the Erfurt Declaratron that aithough the
polrtrcal clrcumstances havc dramatrcally' chang-
ed srnce the Trcatv u'as srgncd, it contrnues to
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form a valuable part of the Europcan secuntl'
archrtecture
13. In the hght of the nerv definitron of WEU's
role vis-ir-vrs thc European Union and NATO,
thc future apphcation of thc modrfied Brussels
Treaty cven takes on a new drmension that must
be examined more closely It rs also of partrcular
srgnificance that rn Erfurt the minrstcrs tasked
the Permanent Council to reflect on procedures
within WEU facilitatrng consensus-buildrng and,
rvhere appropriate. the emergence of a decrsron to
act in response to a specific crtsis, rvithrn the
framervork of the relevant provrsions of the
modified Brussels Treaty.
14 As far as the Assembly is aware. this is
the first timc rn the history of WEU that the Per-
mancnt Councrl has been given a task of thrs
sort It shou's that there rs clearly'a readiness to
make greater usc of thc WEU decision-takrng
mechanrsm rn the future If that were to prove to
be the case. lt must be secn as a vcry posltive
devclopment superseding the prevaihng u,idelr'-
held vreu'that WEU is a forum in u,hich matters
can be drscussed but not decidcd
15 It rs to be hoped that the process of reach-
rng agreement on the arrangements for facrlitat-
rng consensus-burldrng x'ill not be hampered by'
frustratrng drsputes France rs knosn to have
proposed that the prrncrple of constructrve ab-
stentron rntroduced rnto the Amsterdam Treatv
also be apphed r)'rthrn WEU The German 
'''tcu'
rs that thrs rs unnecessary because rn WEU a
countn' that rs actrl'el1' rnvolved in a decisron to
conduct a Petersberg mrssion is not obhgcd to
partlcrpatc rn rts rmplemcntation.
16 It rs partrcularly urgent to reach surft
agreement on facrlrtating consensus-burldrng rn
vrcrv of the fact that under Artrcle VIII 3, thc
modrfied Brussels Treatf is the only treatl, to
contarn a provrslon makrng rt mandatory for thc
Councrl to hold consultatrons in crisrs sltuatlons.
Neither Artrcle J 6 of the Amsterdam Treaty nor
Articlc 4r of the North Atlantic Treatv have
anlthrng comparable. Hou'cver, Article VIII 3
of thc modrfied Brussels Treatl' has thc drau'-
back of onlv requrnng the Council to be con-
vcned rn the event of a peace-threatenrng srtua-
tron rf this is requestcd b1' one of the Hrgh Con-
-t 
S.. upp""dr.x for thc precise wordrng of these
artrcles
tractrng Parties Thus thc drfficulty is not only to
rcach a conscnsus. but also to convene thc
Council in the first placc to consult on a crlsts
situatron. Morcover. our experience thus far is
that in practrce member states hardly' ever avail
themselves of the possibrh[' of convcnrng the
Councrl in accordance u'rth Artrcle VIII 3
17 Thc fact that the Permanent Council holds
regular meetmgs at ambassadorial level ls not a
solution, for the decisron to convene the Council
pursuant to Artrclc VIII 3 is generalll' a polrtrcal
one that many' states arc reluctant to takc This
can be explained in a number of cases qurte
srmply b1'the fact that the relel'ant mrnrstries and
pohcr,-makers are not sufficrently rvell ac-
quarnted rrrth the provlslons of the modrficd
Brussels Treaty. Hou.ever, there are manv othcr
reasons It takcs not onlv a spccral polrtrcal
commrtment but also a readrness to engage in
consultations to avarl oncsclf of Artrcle VIII 3
If a state does not consrdcr rts oun rntercsts to bc
partrcularlv affected. then rt has no reason to take
the rnrtratn'e. If, on the contrar)', rts oun vital
mterests are rndccd at stakc, then it may' not be
preparcd to engage rn consultatrons and to share
the decisrons s'ith others
18 Thc Pcrmanent Councrl's mandatc should
therefore bc extendcd to col'cr thc qucstron of
hou., morc generalh' speakrng, the practical ap-
phcatron of Article VIII 3 can be facrlrtated Onc
solution u,ould be to cxtcnd the nght of inrtratrvc
to the WEU Secretan -General and the Assem-
bli' Hou'evcr. srnce thrs rs unreahstrc, gtven thc
rcluctance of membcr governments to consrdcr
amcndrng the Treatr'. an cffort should first be
made to improve procedurcs urthout amending
the Treatl'. Thrs urll depend on strengthcning the
spccrficalll, politrcal responsrbrlrtl' of the countn,
holding the Prcsrdencv at anv trme. and on en-
hancrng its arvareness of that responsrbrlrtl,
19 We have secn time and agatn hou'hard rt
is for Europe to rcspond srirftll to actual cnsts
srtuations Thrs rs duc not onlv to drfficulties in
reachrng a consensus on the issuc itself. but also
to drvergrng vieu's as to ri'hether the crisis should
be handlcd first and foremost b1' the EU, WEU,
NATO, thc OSCE, Unrted Natrons or an ad hoc
coalrtron. In the field of WEU-EU relattons thcre
rs urdespread support for the ueu'that the malor
drfficulties could havc bccn overcome rf it had
been possible at Amsterdam to rntcgrate WEU rn
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thc EU It is felt, hon,ever. that as long as thc
responsrbrlitl, for polrtrcal and economic cnsrs
management lies u'ith the EU. ri'hrle that for
mrlrtary crisis management lies rvrth WEU, rt ri'rll
remaln difficult to reach a conscnsus on rccourse
to military'means ln casc of needa
20 Whether the main problem is indeed the
lack of a singlc organisatronal framcwork for
cnsrs management rs a moot pornt Up until norv
there has been a lot oftalk of action bf intcrlock-
rng and complcmcntan' rnstrtutions. Hou,ever it
is not onlv the mstrtutrons that arc important, but
also thc treatres on u'hrch they are founded.
Hence more attcntion should be paid in the future
to applf ing the relevant treatres m such a way as
to ensure that thev are rndeed complementarv to
each other. The Treatv on European Union, for
lnstancc. allocates certarn functrons and tasks to
WEU as an organrsatron, u'rthout establishrng
anv link at all rrrth the modrfied Brussels Trcatl'
Yet rf WEU rs indeed a "multr-purpose rnstru-
ment". then this is prccrselv bccause the modrfied
Brussels Treatv rs a "multi-purposc trcat\,".
n'hrch stnves both for Europcan rntegratron and
transatlantic cooperation wrthrn NATO. Srncc
nerther the European Unron nor NATO have
anlthing equrvalent to Artrcle VIII 3 to refer to,
WEU member states should. rn the earhest pos-
srble stages of an cmergrng crisrs. convene the
Councrl of WEU for consultations pursuant to
Artrcle VIII 3. rn ordcr to provide both the Euro-
pean Unron and NATO 'ivrth their assessment of
thc srtuatron. therr conclusrons and, rvhere ap-
proprlatc. therr proposals for decisrons
2l Anv decisron of thc European Unron to
avarl rtsclf of WEU rn pursuance of Artrclc J 7 of
the Amsterdam Treatl' should. as far as possrblc.
be based on approprlate preparatrons bv WEU
rtself This rs rn keeprng rvrth the provisron that
WEU should not onlf implcmcnt. but also elabo-
rale dccrsrons and actrons of the European Unron
u'hrch have defence rmplications This rs rvhy' rt
rs also rmportant to cnsure from the outset that
WEU should. rn the frameu'ork of the CFSP,
make substantral contnbutions to the work of the
Pohcl' Plannrng and Earlv Warnrng Unit that was
created rn Amsterdam Hou'ever, the activities of
this unrt cannot rcplacc polrtrcal consultations in
tTh. t*" expressed b1' the German Foreign Affairs
Mrnrstcr. Mr Krnlicl, rn hrs address to the WEU
Asscmbly on I December 199'7
thc framovork of Artrcle VIII 3 of the modified
Brussels Trcaty.
22 When dcfining the modus operandt for
linkrng the dccision-takrng proccsses of both or-
ganlsatrons rn crisrs-managcmcnt opcrailons for
rvhrch the EU avarls itsclf of WEU, it should be
estabhshed even more clcarlv that thc Council of
WEU may' itself take thc initiative of submrtting
its anal1,5i5 of the situatron to the European
Unron rn order to preparc and facrlrtate decision-
taking rvithrn the Europcan Union dunng an
emerglng cnsls
23 The neu' nature of WEU-NATO coopera-
tron adds yet another drmensron to the application
of the modrficd Brussels Treatl' Notu'ithstand-
rng NATO's successful peace mission to former
Yugoslavia, there is no guarantee that NATO
u'rll alx,a1,s be available as a tool for crrsrs man-
agcment, espccially srnce thrs is not provrdcd for
bv the Washinglon Treatl' In the event of a crr-
srs srtuation ri,hich has to bc managed u'rthout thc
actn'e partrcrpatron of the North Amerrcan allr'.
Europe should have the means of autonomous
crlsrs management, haung recourse rvhcre ncccs-
san' to NATO's mrlitary capabrlrtl' for opera-
trons conductcd undcr WEU's political control
and strategrc drrectron
21. Frnalll. WEU could takc an autonomous
decrsron on thc piannrng and implementation of a
Petersbcrg mlssron. possrbll' u,rthout having re-
course to NATO asscts and capabrlrtres, but
calhng on the forccs ansu'erable to WEU
(FAWEU) and therr hcadquarters Moreover thc
flcxrbrlrty' of the modrficd Brusseis Treatl' ts suf-
ficrcnt to allou' all other types of operatron, such
as thosc planned and implemented b1, one or sc\'-
eral framex'ork natrons, rvhich the WEU Councrl
u'ould support u'ithout necessarilv taking on the
polrtrco-miiitary direction and control of thc op-
eratlon Thus there arc a multitudc of reasons
for steadfastly, supportlng the rntentron an-
nounced bi,' the WEU ministers rn their Erfurt
Declaration of rmprovmg consensus-burldrng and
decrsron-taking proccsscs in thc framework of the
modrfied Brussels Trcatv
III. The role of WEU as a precursor of an
enlarged European security and defence union
25 In Erfurt all 28 natrons reaffirmed therr
conrmrtmcnt to creatrng a colrlmon European se-
curltv arca free of dn'rdrng hnes, in u,hich all
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states are partncrs in sccuritv From thc German
versron of the Erfurt Declaratron rt uould seem
that 22 of its 59 paragraphs u'crc adoptcd at 28,
2l aI18,8 at 13 and that onl1' 2 xcrc adopted at
10, in other u'ords. by' the slgnatones of the
modrficd Brussels Trcatl'. A noteu,orthy' fact rs
that the paragraphs on the contrnued significance
of thc Treatl' and on thc need to rmprovc the
decrsron-takrng procedure \\'ere adopted at 18, m
othcr uords, rvrth the particrpation of the assocl-
atc member and observer states. Moreover rt
u'ould appcar that a draft of the annual report
that A(rcle IX of the modificd Brussels Treaty
requrrcs thc Councrl to submit to the Assembll, is
scnt svstematrcallv to all 28 WEU states for
comment. bcfore thc final version gocs to the
Assembly'.
26 The \\'cstcrn European Armaments Or-
ganisation (WEAO) u'as creatcd pursuant to
Artrcle VIII.2 of the modrfied Brusscls Trcatv as
a subsidrary bodl' of thc WEU Councrl. desprtc
the fact that three of rts mcmbcrs have neither
srgned nor ratrfied the Trcatt' rtself nor the
Agreemcnt of ll Mav 1955 on the status of
WEU Thc defence mmisters of the 13 members
of the \\restem European Armaments Group
(WEAG). meetrng rn Erfurt. agreed modalrtres
for thc partrcrpatron rn all WEAG mcetrngs of
rntcrcsted WEU obsen'er countrres rvhrch are not
mcmbers of WEAG For the associate partners
thev drerr up arrangements allox'ing WEAG
Pancls and thcrr sub-groups to cxamrne u'hether,
for each ltem on thc agcnda. partrcrpation could
be opened to them Whcrc approprrate. assoclate
partners mav be rnvrtcd to partrcipate rn NAD
and mrnistenai meetrngs Thc Transatlantrc
Forum. involvrng thc tcn WEU members and
three associate members. rs consrdcrcd to be a
Councrl u'orkmg group and obscn,cr states are
also entitled to partrcrpate tn lts actrvtties The
Charr of the Transatlantrc Forum does not coin-
crde rvrth the Presrdencl' of the WEU Councrl
27. All these examples shou' that thc ovcr-
u'helmrng malont)' of WEU's activitres can be
conducted rn a urde vanetv of organisational
framcu'orks. onlv a vcr], fe\\' of uhrch are cov-
cred br thc modrfied Brussels Treaty,. Efforts to
rnvoive assoclatc members, observers and asso-
cratc partners rn WEU's activitres are most cer-
tarnlr to be u'elcomed. Hou'ever, the more this is
done outsrde thc framervork provrded b1, thc
Treatr. the morc the legrtimacy' of that Treaty' rs
hkeli' to be callcd rnto questron Thrs also ap-
phes to the relatronshrp bcttvecn thc Councrl and
the Assembll,, for Article lX of thc modrfied
Brussels Treaty, is only' apptrcablc to the tcn full
member states of WEU Thrs u'as u'h\,, rn rts
Rccommendatron 6185. the Assembly called on
the Council to create a sound legal basis for par-
trcrpation in the Organisation's actrvitres by all
thosc WEU states u'hrch are unrulhng or unable
to accede to the modificd Brussels Treaty. In rts
repli', the Councrl merelv referred to its Declara-
trons of 22 Julv and l8 November 1997 (Erfurt).
28 In rts Declaratron of 22 JuJy 1997, the
Councrl u,ent no furthcr than to announce that it
nould examine the modalrtres requrred to allon'
assocrate membcr, obscrver and assocratc partner
states to partrcrpate morc closell' rn the vanous
actrvrties of WEU In Erfurt, thc Mrnrsters con-
firmed the immedrate apphcatron on a provrsronal
basrs of the arrangemcnts contarned rn Artrclc
J 7 .3. of the Amsterdam Treatv allou'rng WEU
obsen'er states to partlcrpate on an equal footrng
rn Petersberg tasks for u'hrch the EU avails rtsclf
of the WEU In ans*'er to a questron hc put to
thc Charrman-in-Office on I Deccmbcr 1991
about u'hether these arrangements rverc to bc
submrtted to the national parhaments for ap-
proval. r'our Rapporteur recer'"'ed the follou'rng
ans\\.er
"Thc ansucr to the questron of u'hether
thrs decrsron urll bc submrtted to natronal
parhamcnts dcpends on thc constrtutronal
provrslons at natronal lcvcl Accordrng to
the German rntcrprctatron, an amendment
to the EU Trcatv u'ould bnng about a con-
sequcnt alteratron to thc WEU Treaty As
vou knou'. the relcvant provrsron of Artrcle
,-6,17" has bcen submrtted for approval to thc
German Parhament rn the framnvork of
the ratrficatron procedure for thc results of
Amsterdam We therefore do not consrder
- 
and I repeat that thrs rs the German legal
interpretatron 
- 
that it rs necessan' for thc
Bundestag to adopt a decision on thc WEU
Treatr'"
29 A simrlar posrtlon rvas defended under thc
Gemran rnterprctatron of rnternatronal lau' in
t U*urh'adoptcd br the Standrng Committee
on 16 October 1991 (see Assembly'Document l58l).6 Correspondrng to Artrcle J 7 of thc Amsterdam
Treatv
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connectlon \\'rth the slgnmg of thc Maastncht
Trcaty Accordrng. for example. to thc German
rnternatronal law professor Frou'ern7, thc rnstr-
tutronal hnk between the EU and WEU anslng
out of Article J 4 of the Maastncht Treaty rs "an
extremeh' unusual case", in that lt u'as rntro-
duced rvrthout any formal amcndmcnt to the
founding Treaty of WEU Onc must nevertheless
assume a consequent amcndment to that Treat1,,
he argues, because to the extcnt that all WEU
mcmbcr states are also membcrs of the EU, the
conclusron of the Maastncht Treaty must be seen
as amendmg the modrfied Brussels Treaty. It
cannot, on the grounds that Parhamcnt must ap-
prove amendments to treatles. be claimed that
thrs amcndment gives rrse to constrtutional prob-
lems rn membcr states. because thc Maastrrcht
arrangemcnts were ratrfied bi' the parhamcntary
assemblies of those states. Bv grvrng thcrr ap-
proval. he says, parhaments b1' rmphcation ac-
cepted an amendment to the modrfied Brusscls
Treatr'. making WEU an intcgral part of thc dc-
vclopment of the European Unron
30 If rt rs assumcd that this, or somethrng like
rt. is the legal interpretatron put fonvard b1' a
number of other WEU states as u'cll. then in the
course of therr ratrfication procedurgs care
should at least be taken to estabhsh that thc parl-
iaments concerned are rndced a\\'are that their
ratrficatron of the Amsterdam Treatv (hke that of
thc Maastncht Treatr before rt) entarls simulta-
neous approval of an amendment to the modified
Brusscls Trcatv Whether thrs rs rndeed the pre-
varhng vle\\' rn all the parhaments rs, to say the
least, questronable Accordrng. at anv rate, to the
vrews expressed to 1'our Rapporteur b1'the Greek
Forergn Affarrs Minister. Mr Pangalos. the Am-
stcrdam Treatl'does not imply'an amendment to
the modified Brussels Treaty' but merely la1's
down political guidehnes.
3l If the Amsterdam Treaty does rndced en-
tail a consequent amcndment to the modificd
Brussels Treat\,, then logically thrs amendment
should be expressed in that Trcatl' Yct in rts
Reply' to Recommendatron 618, the Councrl ex-
plicrtly' confirmcd that devclopments in WEU's
relatrons u,rth the Europcan Unron (and NATO)
' S"" Ctorrtran Tomuschat, Rechtsprobleme etner
europatschett Srcherhet t.s- und l/ertetdtgungspolthk,
(The legal problems of a European security and
defence pohq'). Herdelberg 1997, p 13 ff
drd not call for anv changes to thc modrfied
Brussels Treatr,. Thrs problem should bc bornc
rn mrnd rn connection rvrth the ratrficatlon procc-
dures in the national parhamcnts and drscusscd
u'rth the governments of mcmbcr statcs Fur-
thermore, in its replv to Rccommcndatron 618,
the Council refers to paragraph 29 of thc Erfurt
Declaratron, conceming improved arrangements
for the parhcrpatron of assocrate members and
observers in all Petersbcrg opcratrons undertaken
by WEU, and tasks the Permanent Council to
pursue its examrnatron of possibrlities for mari-
mum partrcipation rn rts actrvrtres by associatc
members and obscn'er states rn accordance u,ith
therr status, m partrcular rn the fields of arma-
ments, space and mrlitary studies
32 It appears from this that there is no rnten-
tron of establishing cooperatlon on a Icgally'
sound basis above and be1'ond the internal and
informal arrangements ii'ithin WEU Thcsc ar-
rangements, u,hrch do not entarl changcs of
status, have not becn sub.;ected to parhamentan
scrutmy Thev are based on decrsions taken bv
the Councrl on l8 November 1997 of u'hrch thc
Assembly rvas onlv rnformed rn Januan' 19988 as
a result of a point rarscd bl, I'our Rapporteur
durrng the plenan' scssron rn December 1997
These decrsrons rn manv cascs supersedc pre-
vious statcments and decrsrons by' the Councrl
wrth respect to thc rolc of assocrate member and
observer statcs. Moreover thct' ma1' have reper-
cusslons for thc role of the parhamentary repre-
scntatlves and dclegatrons of these countncs to
the WEU Asscmbll' Yet a closer study of thrs
qucstron rs hampercd bt' the fact that the
Asscmbly rs not famrliar rvrth all the documents
to s'hrch thc Councrl refers
33 Thus there is a dangcr of the basrs for co-
operatlon betrveen WEU full members on the one
hand, and the assocrate members, observcrs and
assocrate partners, on thc other hand, bccomrng
increasrnglv complex and less transparent
Moreover there rs a danger of drvcrgcncc be-
tu'een the rules and regulatrons that appll,to the
Assemblv and the Councrl respectrvell' If ue
rvrsh to ensure that WEU rs capablc of action
ivhile allourng for maximum particrpatron by, all
28 WEU statcs, then u'e must reflect upon new
solutions in order to srmphfr' the legal situation
and bring about greater efficiencv and transpar-
ilEo*r,r*t A/WEU/DG[98] 3. 8 Januarl' 1998
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ency. It is proposed to address thcsc rssues rn the
remainder of this report
34. Yet even in those areas involvrng an appli-
cation of the Treatl, itself, rt is not alu'ays easy
for the Assemblv to fulfil its tasks In thcrr
Erfurt Declaration, Minrsters "noted the decrsion
of the Permanent Councrl to abohsh thc Agency
for the Control of Armaments They further
notcd that, u,ith this decision, Protocol No IV of
the modrficd Brussels Treatl' has ceased to have
practrcal effect" The Secretary-General of WEU
informed the Assemblv of the Permanent Coun-
crl's decrsron ln a letter dated 12 November
lggJe, rvhrch states that the ACA was created by
the WEU Councrl as its first subsidiarv body
pursuant to Article VIII of the modified Brussels
Treaty on 7 May 1955. one da1' after entry' into
force of the Pans Agrecments. In ordcr to give
the Assembly an opportunity to asscss the reper-
cussions of the decrsion to abohsh the ACA, the
President of the Assembly asked to recerve the
text of the decision of 7 Ma1' 1955 The Councrl
refused on the grounds that the minutes of the
relcvant Council meetrng u'ere secret and that rt
u'as not sure that the declassrficatron of thrs
document u'ould be agreed to.
35 The Assemblv can onh, regret that the
Councrl, cven after 43 y,ears of reportrng on arrns
control questrons, has so lrttle trust rn the
Assembll' rn thrs ko' area of the latter's activitres
pursuant to Artrcle IX of the modrfied Brussels
Treatl' that rt feels unable to keep rt full,v in-
formed. Moreover, follourng the Councrl's de-
cisron of I I Aprrl 1995 to end the actrvrtres of
the Ageno, for the Control of Armaments as of
3l October of the same vear, lt rs unclear u-hy' a
further decisron officially' abohshrng rt \\'as
deemed necessar)', if it rvas not also the rntcntron
to amend thc Treatv accordrnglv and to dcclare
Protocol No. IV null and vord The entn' rnto
force of the Chemical Weapons Trcatv rs not
enough to explarn thrs, since the ACA u,as also
responsrble for controlling the production of
biologrcal and nuclear \\'eapons
36 What is the meaning of the statement that
due to the Councrl's decisron, Protocol No. IV
"ceascs to have practical effect"? Without being
famrhar rvrth the decrsron of 7 May 1955, it rs
n Document A/WEU/DG[9'71 30 revrsed
ber 1997.
impossible to judge rvhcther thrs rvas reallv the
decisron that constrtutcd the ACA Indeed, the
text of Protocol No. IV u,ould seem to suggest
that rt was not, since it reads that the srgnatoncs
of the modified Brussels Treaty '' . agrccd, in
accordance wrth Article IV of the protocol modr-
fizing and completrng the Treaty, to cstablish an
Agency for the Control of Armaments" Thrs
rvould seem to indicate that the founding act for
the ACA was not the Council decision of 7 May
1955, but Protocol No. IV itself, in rvhich case
the ACA could onl1, be abolished by revoking
that protocol The procedure used by the
Councrl to ad.lust to the neu,srtuation, which was
to take decrsions that in cffcct cancel parts ofthe
Treatl,and rts protocols urthout subjecting those
decrsions to parliamcntan, scrutiny, onll' aggra-
vates the legal uncertaintl, u'hrch already exrsts
rvrth regard to thc contrnued vahdrtl, of the
Treatl, as a rvhole. It therefore contradrcts the
statement b1' the mrnisters of the WEU member
states in the Erfurt Declaratron assertrng that the
modified Brussels Treaty' contrnues to form a
valuable part of the European secuntv archrtec-
ture.
37 Srncc WEU u'ill continue to exrst for some
time to come as an organisation rn rts orrn nght
u'ith neulv defined responsrbrlities, the Council
urll havc no chorce but to adapt the Treaty itself
to the neu' srtuation Thrs rs mainly because of
the rcvrsed versron of the Treaty on European
Uruon u'hich puts relatrons betrveen WEU and
the EU on a new footrng, but also because ofthe
neu- form of cooperation bctween WEU and
NATO. Should the Councrl farl to do so, thrs
ivill only aggrayale the lcgal grev areas at a trme
rvhen WEU needs to have a clear legal basis in
order to hve up to its future tasks
1. Enhanced cooperation behyeen WEU
and the EU and its implications
38 Accordrng to Article l7 (Artrcle J 7 of the
Amsterdam Treatl') of the consolidated versron
of the Treaty' on European Union, WEU rs an
integral part of the European Union's develop-
ment WEU supports the European Union in
framing the defence policy aspects of the CFSP
and rs consrdered by some people to be the "S" in
CFSP'o The European Uruon is therefore call-
ing for closer instrtutronal links rvith WEU, rvrth
m F*"rgn Mrnistcr Krnkcl addressing the WEU
Assembly on I December 199'7
l0
25 Novem-
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a vrc\\' to the possrblc integration of WEU in the
European Union, should this be decided by the
European Council. In calhng for closcr instrtu-
tional ties with WEU, thc EU has entered into
specific commitments wrth regard to WEU, the
consequences of u'hrch call for closer examina-
tion. It rs rmportant to take due account of the
fact that there are currently 28 WEU nations and
that this family of states is the precursor of the
"great EU of the future"'1.
39. The development of closer rnstitutional
links concerns all WEU bodies rncluding the
Assembll. Furthcrmore, to make sense in both
polrtrcal and practrcal terms, this process must
not be confined to the ten full member states but
should also include relatrons betrveen the EU and
those nations of the ''WEU famrly" u'hich arc not
vct members of the European Union Thrs is true
for thc three associate members and thc tcn as-
sociate partners of WEU The latter are all as-
plnng members of thc European Unton, rvhtle
Turkey is thc only' WEU assocrate member to
have applied for EU membcrship
40. So far the EU has mvrtcd only' five WEU
associate partner states to start accession talksr2
Grven the complexity of this issue. the accession
procedure rvrll probably take a long time In the
meantime, horvever, and rn thc hght of the Am-
sterdam Treatl' commitment to closer institu-
tional tres urth WEU. the EU should look for
u'avs of brrngrng closcr those WEU states u,hich
cannot officralll' bccome members of the EU in
the foreseeable future
4l In thrs respect rt rs partrcularlv rmportant
to consrder hou' to rnvolve them more closely
than before rn CFSP actrvttres. This apphes both
to the assocrate membcrs and assoclate partners
of WEU A first step by the EU tou'ards fostcr-
ing closer institutional rclatrons ri'ith WEU could
therefore be to mvolve these states in the actrvi-
ties of thc second prllar of the EU In Recom-
mendation 62513, the Assembll' called on the
Councrl to takc thc necessary inrtiatives vis-a-vrs
n lb,d
'2 The Czech Repubhc, Estonia. Hungary', Poland
and Sloverua
'3 Adopted on .1 Dccember 199'7 on thc basrs of Mr
Martinez-Casafl's report on the consequences of the
Madnd NATO summit for the del'elopment of
WEU's relations u'ith central and eastern European
countries and Russia (Assembly Document 1585).
the EU rvith regard to the associatc partner
states The Councll responded to this recom-
mendation much more quickly,than is its rvont.
replying that it is not up to WEU to decide in any
way on European Union modalitres pertaining to
CFSP issucs. But thrs u,as not the point of the
Assembll,'s request If WEU is indeed the "S" ln
CFSP, if the EU rs to foster closer rnstitutional
links r.vith WEU and arrangements for enhanced
cooperation between the two Organrsations are to
be rvorked out pursuant to the protocol to Article
l7 of the Treatl, on European Union (Article J.7
of the Amsterdam Treaty), then WEU is entitled
to approach the EU with a request for involving
its assocrate members and assocrate partners
morc closely than before rn CFSP actrvitres.
42 This also anscs out of the WEU Dcclara-
tron of 22 Jult, 1997. rn u'hich member countrres
state therr rntentron to immedrately examme a set
of measures for enhancing cooperation betu'een
WEU and the EU, in particular
arrangements for improving the coordr-
natlon of the consultatron and decision-
makrng processes of thc respective or-
ganrsatlons, ln partrcular in cnsls
srtuations;
- 
holdrng ofjornt meetings of the relevant
bodrcs of the tu'o organisatrons
During the corresponding negotiations u,ith the
EU, partrcular attentron is to be pard to involvmg
thc associate mcmber and associate partner
states
43 The European Commrssion exphcrtl)'con-
firmed n fis Agenda 2000 that the ten assocrate
partners of WEU u'hrch. together rvrth Cyprus,
have been accepted b1'the EU as candidates for
accessron, fulfil all the crrteria for full partrcrpa-
tion rn thc activities of the CFSP Although Tur-
key, as an associate member of WEU. has been a
candidate for EU membershrp for much longer
than these clcven states, the EU Commisston
treated rt drfferentlv from the others and did not
examrne the questron of its possrble participation
rn CFSP activitrcs The European Union did not
rnvrte Turkey to particrpate rn accesston talks
and drd not accept rt among the states bctng con-
sidcred as candrdates for a second round of ac-
cesslon negotrations I1
r 
nn fg-iu, Latvra, Lithuania, Romanra and
Slovakra
il
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44 Thc drfferent trcatment meted out to Tur-
kcy at the European Counctl in Luxcmbourg on
12 and 13 Decembcr 1991. u'hrch dccrdcd it s'as
ehgrble not for an "accesslon stratcgv". but for a
''European strategy" and gave rt no prospect of
anv timeframe for eventual accession, \\'as, as \\'c
know, a sourcc of malor drsappointment and bit-
terness Some Turkrsh represcntattves consulted
by the Rapporteur rvent to far as to remark iront-
cally'that it uould certarnll' havc been easier for
Turkev to accede to the EU had it been a formcr
Warsau' Pact member, rathcr than a member of
NATO It rs not the arm of thrs report to raisc
once agarn the tssue of Turk*"s membership of
the EU It ma1'well be that the politrcal and cco-
nomic condrtions for startrng accession talks arc
not currenth, met Morcover, Turkcl' rtself rs
full1 au'are of rts shortcomings rn this respcct
As rcgards the rnvolvement of Turkcr', and m-
decd that of anv other WEU assoclatc mcmbers
u'ho so u'rsh, rn the enhanccd cooperatton bc-
tu'een the EU and WEU. thcrc rs no doubt tn
vour Rapporteur's mrnd that Turkcy', as a mem-
ber of NATO. assoctate mcmbcr of WEU, a
country that has been assoctatcd u'tth the Euro-
pean Communrtv srncc I963 and that rs bound to
the EU b1' a customs unlorl. fulfils the condttions
for partrcrpatron ln the CFSP
45 Thc decrsron approved rn Erfurt to har-
monrse thc sequence of the WEU and EU Prcsr-
dencres must also be scen rn thc hght of thc
commrtment entrenchcd rn the Amsterdam Trcatv
to fosterrng closer rnstrtutronal tres luth WEU If
the arm rs rndeed, as stated bv the Mrnrsters rn
Erfurt. to achrel'e grcatcr s\nergv bctrvcen the
uork of the tu'o organrsatrons, then thrs commrt-
ment on the part of thc EU providcs the WEU
bodres rr th more sohd grounds on uhrch to call
for rccrprocrtl' rn their relatrons urth the EU
Thrs not onll' means makrng lt easrer for EU
bodres to avarl themseh'es of the capabrlrtres of
thc drfferent WEU bodres. but also the reverse
Unfortunatclr thrs polnt rs not put across suffi-
crentlv clearll' rn paragraph 7 of thc Declaration
of22 July 1997
46 Thc harmonrsed sequcncc of the WEU and
EU Presrdencres s'ith a vicu' to creating closcr
instrtutional tres betrvcen the tu'o organisations
also has rcpercussrons for the actrvrties of thc
WEU Asscmbll Thc amual report b1' the
Councrl srll m thc futurc also have to covcr the
Europcan Union's actlvltles in the field of the
CFSP, as well as the progress achicved rn the
field of practrcal coopcratlon bctu'een thc tu'o
organisatrons. Morcover, the Asscmblr' and rts
committees should be regularly rnformed by' the
relevant EU bodies, and rn partrcular the CFSP
Secretary'-General. about their activrtres, and be
given opportunrtics to exchangc vieu's rvith them.
Frnalh', thc nov qualrtl' of EU-WEU relations
ri,rll surely also have an impact on the WEU As-
sembl1"s futurc rclationshrp urth the European
Parlamcnt Thus it rs qucstronablc irhethcr thc
European Parhament's refusal to allorv members
of the WEU Assemblv to takc the floor during
plenary' sessions of the European Parhament at
rvhrch sccurity rssues arc berng drscussed rs com-
patible ivrth Article 17 | 2 (Article J 7 of thc
Amstcrdam Treatl') of thc consolidatcd versron
of thc Treatl'on Europcan Uruon.
47 On 16 March 1998. neu' rmpetus u'as
grven to the relatrons betueen the WEU Assem-
blv and the European Parhament. u'hcn a number
of members of the Assemblr"s Polrtrcal Commrt-
tcc attended a mectlng rn Brussels follourng an
rnvrtatron from thc European Parliament's Sub-
Commrttec on Sccuntl' and Drsarmament to hold
.;ornt discusslons on the report b1' Mr Leo Trnde-
mans on "thc gradual estabhshmcnt of a cornmon
defence policl' for the European Unron". Thesc
very detarled and useful drscussrons, rvhich u'erc
also altended bi- the Prcsrdcnt of the WEU As-
semblv. also provrded an opportunitv to broach
outstandmg rssues pertarnlng to WEU Assem-
blr'/Europcan Parhament relatrons rn general,
\\rtrrle so far there has bccn no convergcnce bc-
t*'ccn the tu'o assembhcs on the fundamcntal
lssues. partrcularlv as rcgards recrprocrty' in their
relatrons, there rs gencral agreemcnt bctrvgcn the
tu'o that rt is useful to pursue therr informal dia-
loguc Horvever it u'ould also be desrrablc for
thc European Parhament's Commrltec on Forergn
Affarrs. Secuntl' and Dcfence Pohcl'to decrde to
occasronallr' rnvite members of thc WEU As-
sembl1"s Polrtrcal Committee for an cxchange of
!'le\\.s. Thrs u,ould be rn hne u'rth Mr Tinde-
man's proposal to develop thc u'orkrng relatrons
betu'cen the tu'o parhamcntan' assembhes
48 To the extent that rt rcfers to relations ruth
the European Union, thc Erfurt Dcclaratton
raiscs a u'hole series of othcr qucstrons The As-
sembll', for example. is not informed of thc
nature of the "substantral progress achreved rn
the short trmc span srnce Amsterdam m translat-
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rng the reinforccd rnstitutronal hnks bctn'ccn thc
European Unron and WEU lnto a practrcal rcal-
rty"' that rs rvelcomed in thc Erfurt Declaration
Thc Assemblv noted rvrth mtercst thc rnformatron
the Council providcd in June 1997 on thc actr.r,r-
tres of the WEU-EU ad hoc group on definrng a
common defencc pohcl' It u,rshcs to be kcpt
abreast of progrcss in thrs area and rvould par-
trcularlr, hke to be rnformed of the exact naturc
of WEU's partrcrpatron in this ongorng discus-
sron rvrth the EU
49 The Assembll' takes a specral interest in
rnformatron regardrng the status of prcparatrons
for the creation of a Pohcy Plannrng and Earlv
Warning Urut m the EU. If. as announccd in the
WEU Declaratron of 22lul1' l99lr. this unrt rs to
have the possrbrlrtv of avaihng itsclf of WEU's
Plannrng Ccll. Srtuatron Centre and Satellrte
Centre. then it rs important to cnsurc from the
outset that WEU enloys high-level reprcsentatron
rn thrs unrt. Given the naturc of thc lattcr's ac-
tivitres. it u'ould be appropnatc to transfcr the
responsibrhty for directing rt to the Secrctan'-
Gcneral of WEU u'ho should at the same trme be
the CFSP Secretarl'-Gcneral This uould cffcc-
tivcly brrng about the convergence betrveen the
drffcrent "u'orkrng cultures'' of the tu,o organtsa-
trons, on nhrch. accordrng to the Erfurt Declara-
tron, therr da1'-to-dav coopcration depends
2. WTII-NATO relations
and the operational development of WEU
50 The focal pornt of future WEU-NATO
cooperatlon s'rll conttnuc to bc thc crcatron of a
genume Europcan secunt), and defencc identrtv
(ESDI) urthin NATO Grvcn that thrs entarls
adapting mrlrtan, structures and. rn partrcular.
crcatrng European command arrangements ruthrn
the NATO command structures, the crcatron of
the ESDI u'ill remain uncertarn as long as France
has not taken a final decisron about reJolnlng
NATO's mrlrtary structures
5l Even rf WEU rs genumelv recognrsed as
bcrng an csscntial element of the development of
the ESDI u'rthrn NATO. it rs strll drfficult to de-
fine that rdentrtv Accordrng to the Erfurt Dec-
laration, thc arm of thc ESDI is to enable all
European Alhancc partners to assume greater re-
sponsrbrhh' for thcir sccurrtv and defence In the
NATO Forergn Minrstcrs' communrque of June
1996, the arm rs descnbcd in somr:w'hat differcnt
terms as bcing to "cnablc all European Allics to
makc a more coherent and cffcctrl,c contrrbutron
to the mlsslons and actrvitres of thc Alhancc as
an expression of our shared responsrbrlrtics, to
act themsclr.es as requlred and to strengthen thc
transatlanti c partncrshrp"
52 According to both of thesc dcfinitions.
only' NA'l'O's European members. namelr,. thc
tcn full mcmbcrs and three assoctate members of
WEU plus Dcnmark as a NATO member and
WEU obscrvcr, arc rnvoh,ed rn the ESDI Hou-
ever, in therr Dccembcr l99l Dcclaration, WEU
member statcs sau' thc devclopment of the ESDI
in more gcncral tcrms. a positton u'hich they re-
affirmed rn therr Declaratron of 22 Julv 1997 on
the Treaty' of Amstcrdam In thc vrcu, of the
WEU Secretanat-Gencral. thc dcvelopment of
the ESDI rs to be a thrcc-drmcnsronal proccss
u'hrch takes place u'rthm NATO. thc Europcan
Unron. through the CFSP, and WEU. rihrch rrril
plav a kev role in turnrng lt tnto a tvorkablc con-
ceptri Srnce WEU, u,hcrever possrble. u'orks at
28. and since the Amsterdam Treatr. under cer-
tarn condrtions. puts non-NATO \\'EU obscncr
statcs on an equal footrng ruth WEU full mcm-
bcrs for Pctcrsberg mrsslons. there rs a *,hole
rangc of problcms anslng for the development of
ncu forms of cooperatron betueen WEU and
NATO u'hich arc vrtal for bnngrng about the
ESDI Thc otirer csscntral rssucs. apart from the
problcm of colnmand structurcs. concem the
tcrms on uhrch NATO asscts and capabilities are
to be made avarlable for WEU-lcd opcratrons.
-53 It rs reportcd that u'ork rs currcntlv under
\\ av on arrangcmcnts govcrntng thc rclcase.
transfer and return of NATO asscts Whrlc a
maJontv of the Europcan mcntbcrs of thc Alh-
ance s'ouid like to sce this settled bv means of a
brndrng framelvork agrecment, the Unrtcd Statcs
has so far refused to let any, automattc mccha-
nlsm govcrn recourse to rts natronal assets. It rs
partrcularlv rmportant rn thrs respect to define a
consultation mcchanrsm bets'een WEU and
NATO for WEU-led operatrons haung recoursc
to NATO asscts and capabilrtrcs An rllustratrve
modcl along thc hnes of that ri'hrch u,as outlincd
for WEU and thc EU uas adoptcd in Erfurt rn
order to link WEU and NATO processes for
ttlr*rm the vre,r, exprcsscd b1' thc Deputt'
Secretan'-Gcneral in an addrcss to the Nomcgian
Atlantic Commrttee on 29 Januan. 1998
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takrng decrsions and reachtng agrccmcnt tn crtsis-
management operatrons. but rt has )'ct to bc
u'orkcd out lorntll' rvith NATO
54 Although, or pcrhaps prcctselt' bccausc,
there is no mention of thc CJTF concept rn the
Erfurt Declaratron, it ts tmportant to rccall that
this concept is of vrtal importance for carning
out WEU-led operations usrng NATO assets.
According to our rnformation, the CJTF concept
rs currentlv in rts milrtary rmplcmentatron phase
It rs a mrlrtary command model developed u'ithin
NATO and n'hrch cxpressly provtdes for thc
possrbilrtl' of rts use br WEU. According to rn-
formatron givcn to the Commrttee by the NATO
Secrctarrat-General rn Brussels on l7 Septembcr
1997. the CJTF could be dcplol,ed under thc
polrtrcal control and stratcgtc dtrectton of the
WEU Councrl. under the command of thc Dcputy'
(European) SACEUR. or elsc under a regronal
command CJTF exerctses startcd itr thc autumn
of 1997 u'ith the particrpatron of officers from
the WEU Plannrng Ccll.
55 Another rmportant problcm ts thc tnvolve-
ment of WEU in the NATO dcfcncc planning
process. Thc Erfurt Dcclaration rcfcrs to a dts-
cussron papcr that WEU submtltcd on thrs toprc
to NATO A partrcular problcm u'htch remalns
to be solvcd rs thc parttctpatton of non-NATO
\\/EU obsen'cr states Furthermore. the respon-
srbrlrtrcs of thc nerv WEU Milrtary Commtttee
havc vct to bc clanfied u'ith regard to WEU's
contnbutron to the NATO defence planning
proccss. The more the assocrate partner states
are rnvolved m Petersberg mlssrons. ln accor-
dancc ruth the rntention stated rn thc Erfurt
Dcclaratron. the greater the rmpact on WEU-
NATO u'orking relattons
56 WEU's relations u'rth NATO and rts ef-
forts to create independent mtlttan' structurcs for
rts operatronal development arc also tncrcastnglv
affected b1' the lack of a clcar legal basrs for rts
actrvitres Article IV.2 of the modrficd Brussels
Treatt'16 has been ovcrtakcn bv evcnts and must
be adapted to thc nov situatronrT
-u 
on,.l. N 2 of the modrfied Brussels Treatv reads
"Rccognrsrng the undesrrabilitl, of duplicatlng the
rnrhtary staffs of NATO. the Council and its Agenw
rvrll rell' on thc appropriate military authorltres of
NATO for rnformatron and advice on mihtarv
matte rs"t' Recommendatron 620 of December 1997
3. OutsTancling enlargement issues
57 WEU at 28 has alreadv madc a highly'
srgruficant contribution to the sccuntv of Europc
b1' being a forcrunncr of the sccurrtv and defencc
Europe that u'ill cxist rn a fcu' r,ears' trme
Hou'ever, the EU and NATO have so far adopted
different approaches to cnlargement If WEU rs
to contmue playng a prvotal role betrveen these
t\\'o organrsatlons- it must pa)' more attentron to
enlargement rssucs than has hrtherto been the
case The Erfurt Declaration does not delve into
these questrons, although rt is recogniscd that
WEU has an rmportant role to play in bringing
central and eastcrn European states closer to
Europcan and transatlantrc securitl' structuresr8.
In this Declaratron. Mrnrsters s'elcomed the en-
hancement of the assocrate partners' particrpa-
tlon rn various WEU bodres, ln partrcular those
rclated to crlsls managelnent Furthermore thcv
endorsed a document on the practrcal arrange-
ments for partrcrpatron bv assocrate partners ln
Petersberg mlsslons Thrs documcnt. u'hrch has
not vet been convel,cd to thc Asscmbll'. defines
among othcr things thc rules govcrnlng thc rn-
volvement of thc associatc partncrs rn opcratronal
plannrng. mrlrtan' command structures and polit-
rco-mrirtan' control Minrsters also dreu'up ar-
rangements for thc partrcrpatron of obscn'er and
assocratc partncr statcs rn armaments coopera-
tlon actrvrtrcs
5 8 None of these arrangements entatls
changcs of status. but therr repercussions are
drfficult to evaluate due to a lack of rnformation.
Gn'cn thc drfferent course taken b1' the EU and
NATO enlargement processes. the Assembly'has
alrcadl recommended several trmes that WEU
should reexamlne its enlargement strategv and rn
parhcular rts Declaratron of December 199ire
and define a ne\\' concept. Hox'ever, rn rts replv
to Recommendation 618, the Councrl reaffirmed
that rt drd not consrder a changc of approach ex-
tr Sp...f, Uv Gerrnan Mrnistcr of State Hot'er on
9 January 1998
'e Thc Declaratron rcads as follou's "states rvhich
are mcmbcrs of the European Union are im'ited to
accedc to \\EU on conditions to be agreed in
accordancc u.rth Artrcle XI of the modrfied Brussels
Treaty', or to bccome obsen'ers rf thel' so u'tsh
Srrnultancouslr. other European membcr states of
NATO are rnvrted to become associate members of
WEU rn a rval'uhrch ull gi'i'e them the posstbrlitl'
to partrcipate fulll' rn the activitres of WEU"
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pcdlcnt, slnce the approach berng takcn u'as in
kecping urth WEU's role as a pir,'ot betu'ecn thc
European Unron and NATO
59 Howcvcr, thc srtuation has changed sincc
the Amsterdam Treatv Three of the tcn asso-
ciate partner states (the Czcch Repubhc, Hun-
gary and Poland) have srgned accession protocols
rvith NATO. Thus their full membershrp of the
Alliance is nou' contingent only' upon the ratif-
icatron procedures in the relevant parliaments.
These three states (together u'ith Cyprus, Estonia
and Slovenia) have also been invited to start
accession talks with the European Union. Hence
the principle of therr membership of both NATO
and the EU has been agreed, although it rvill be
some trme yet before the ncgotiatrons rvith the
European Unron are concluded
60 Thrs rr'as u'hr', rn Recommendatton 625,
the Assemblv urged the Council to invite thc
Czech Rcpubhc. Hungarl' and Poland to accede
to the modified Brussels Treatv rn accordance
urth Articlc XI. as soon as they had been rnvitcd
by' the European Unron to start accessron talks.
In its repll'to thrs Recommendatron, the Council
once again confirmcd the full validrty of rts Dec-
laratron of December l99l At the same time it
assured the Assembll'that it attached a high pol-
itical priontl, to enhancing assocrate partner
participatron in vanous WEU bodres and referred
to the practical arrangements approved by Minis-
ters at Erfurt for the participation of these states
in Petersberg missrons However the Assembly
has not been informed of the content of those
practical arrangements. At the December 1997
plenary sessron of the WEU Assembly, rn re-
sponse to a questron from vour Rapporteur con-
cernlng the possibilrties of accession b1' assocrate
partner states to thc modified Brussels Treaty,
the then Charrman-rn-Office confirmed that the
assocrate partner status rvas created rvrth a vicrv
to the full membership of central and castcm
European countrles in the EU and NATO In
their Maastncht Declaration, horvever, the WEU
member states asserted that membershrp of the
EU rvas a prior condition for full membershrp of
WEU
61. This u'ould mean that accession by the
associate partner states to WEU rvould depend
on the outcome of lengthy negotiations between
these countries and the European Union, in which
the key issues have nothing to do rvith European
secunt),questrons It should be remembered that
WEU alreadv play'ed the role of precursor rvrth
rts Krrchberg Dcclaratron, rvhen rt granted asso-
cratc partncr status to the runc members of the
then Forum for Consultation, although not all of
them had srgned a Europe Agreement wrth the
European Unron. Norv that the NATO and EU
cnlargement processes have taken concrete
shape, rt rs rncomprehensrble that the WEU
Councrl should continue to stick to the letter of
its l99l Declaratron. In so doing, rt is strewing
obstacles in the path of the task which the
Councrl itself set for WEU, namell, to bring these
states closer to the Euro-Atlantic structures.
62. If WEU rs rndeed a precursor of the "great
EU", then rt could start accession negotiations at
least rvrth thc three states whrch have already
been invrtcd to acccdc both to the EU and
NATO Thrs u'ould at least be rn kecping u,ith
the sprrrt of thc l99l Dcclaratron Horvcvcr, a
questron r,ihich needs to be examrned rs rvhcthcr
the ncu' srtuatron that has emerged smce Amstcr-
dam. Berhn and Madrrd mrght not provrde WEU
with the opportunrtv of seekrng new approaches
to the enlargement rssue u'hrch could cstabhsh
the hitherto mlssmg conceptual hnk betiveen the
EU and NATO eniargcment policies.
63 Should thrs prove to be the case, there has
to be a fundamental change in the mind-set of the
governments constituting the WEU Council In
Recommendatron 625, the Assembly submrtted a
u'hole set of proposals u'rth the oblectrve, in the
framervork of efforts to bring central and eastern
European states closer to the Euro-Atlantrc
structures, of makrng the EU, NATO and WEU
enlargement policres morc congruent Onc can
therefore onlv note u'rth astonishmcnt that thc
Councrl sees fit rn rts repll'to that Recommenda-
tlon to makc rt qurtc clear that rt docs not con-
srder rtself the appropnatc bod-v- to ans\\'er ques-
ttons pertarnrng to EU or NATO enlargement
64 Of coursc, rt rs up to thc European Union
and NATO themselves to settle the enlargement
problems ansing out of the spccific nature of
those organisatrons Horvever WEU rs an inte-
gral part of the EU's development, as rvell as an
essential element of the development of a Euro-
pean secuntl' and defence identtty,within the At-
lantic Alhance What should WEU's important
role in bnnging the central and eastern European
states closer to thc Euro-Atlantic structures con-
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srst of) Should rt bc confincd to thc possrbrlrtv
granted to assoclats partncr states of partrcipat-
rng rn WEU Councrl mcetings and to lmprovrng
thc condrtrons for thcrr rnvolvemcnt in WEU ac-
trr''rtrcs') Accordrng to the Councrl's reply to
Rccommcndatron 625, this rs an rmportant step
touards makrng WEU a genuinc framovork for
dialogue and cooperatron among Europeans on
European securrtl' and defencc issues in the
broad sense ofthe term
65. It rs hon'ever not enough, if at the same
trme rt rs clarmed that WEU rs the precursor of
the "great EU" of the future and that the Council
of WEU u'as created in order to secure peace and
secuntl'. promote European unity,and grve impe-
tus to thc proccss of Europcan rntegration To
aftain such ob.lcctrvcs requircs a grcat dcal more
thought to bc grvcn than has hrthcrto bccn the
case to a ne\\' enlargement strategy for WEU. to
rcplacc thc conccpt of Dcccmbcr l99l u'hrch has
becn ovcrtaken bt' cvents
66 So far. WEU. for good rcasons, has not
adopted the approach to thc central and castcrn
European states follou'ed bi' the EU and NATO,
u'hrch u'as to select specrfic groups of countrres
for a first round of accessron talks. All assoclatc
partner states are grl'en cqual trcatment ll'rthm
WEU Means'hrle. there is a grou,ing a\\areness
u'rthin the European Unron of how difficult it rs
to drfferenfiate urthout discnminatrng in the en-
largement process. Thrs rs rvhy' the EU has
adopted various supporting measures to take ac-
count of the rntcrcsts of thosc asplnng members
s'hrch have not vet been invrtcd to start accesslon
talks
61 Thus rt rs rntcnded. in parallel to thc ac-
ccssron talks- to spccd up prcparatrons for ncgo-
tlatrons u'rth Bulgarra. Latvia. Lrthuanra. Roma-
nra and Slovakia Morcovcr. at rts mceting on 12
and l3 Deccmber 1997. thc European Councrl
agreed an enhanccd pre-accession strategv rvith a
vreu'to puttrng all asprring mcmbers from central
and eastern Europe in a positron to become
members of the European Uruon in the longer
term
68 The decrsron bv the European Councrl to
hold a jornt meetmg on 30 March 1998 betu'een
the forergn affarrs minrsters of the EU and those
of all ten central and eastern European candi-
dates and C1prus set the accession process in
motron Furthermore. a first European Confer-
ence had bccn hcld on 12 March rn London
uhich brought togethcr thc mcmbcr states of thc
Europcan Unron and "thc Europcan states aspir-
rng to acccdc to lt and sharmg rts values and in-
ternal and crtcrnal oblectrves" Turkey rvas also
rnr,'rtcd but dechned to attcnd in protest against
the separate trcatment grvcn rt rn connectron with
the enlargcmcnt process In the future, thrs Con-
ference is to be hcld once a year at the level of
heads of state and of govemment and once a year
at that of foreign affarrs ministers.
69 The European Commission considers that
all ten central and eastern European candrdates
for the EU fulfilthe condrtrons for full partrcrpa-
tron rn the actrvitres of thc CFSP. This means
thal all the associatc partners of WEU have tan-
grble prospccts of European Union membershtp
and that the onh rcmalnlng unccrtarntv is thc
date Hou.ever, the questron of u'hcthcr and
rvhen thcsc statcs may' partrcipate fully' rn a
Europcan securitt' communitl, such as WEU
cannot be made contrngcnt upon rvhether and
uhcn thcr' fuifil all the critcria for thc first prllar
of the European Unron In any'casc, lt rs drfficult
to undcrstand uhr rt rs not possiblc, in all areas
affectrng sccurrtv u'hrch do not concern the ap-
phcatron of Artrcle V. for WEU associate partner
states to be treated as though thev rvere already
members of the European Union
70 The srtuatron rn the case of NATO is
someu'hat drfferent. NATO has so far srgned
only three accession protocols rvith WEU asso-
crate partner states It rs generally expected that
the ratrficatron proccdure for the accessron of
these states urll bc completed rn time for the 5Oth
annl\rcrsar)' of thc North Atlantrc Trcatl, rn 1999
Houevcr. rt rs hrghil' questronable w'hcther and
rvhcn thc othcr WEU assocrate partncrs rvrll bc
rnvrted to 
.1orn NATO and rvhether, rf at all. a
sccond or thrrd u'ave of cnlargcment rvrll takc
placc. dcsprte NATO's assurances that the first
round u'rll not be the last Thcrc rvrll in any case
be strong drfferentratron u,ithin NATO The
Unrted Statcs and thc European members of
NATO are strll consrderably at variance on
NATO enlargement Moreover there are marked
differences of opinron on the matter between the
US Admrnrstratlon and Congress, in which the
Senate plays the decrsrve role The issue of fur-
ther enlargement ls to be drscussed at the next
NATO summrt meetrng rn 1999. Romania and
Slovenra. u'hose accesslon to NATO was
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partrcularl)'advocated by France and Italy at thc
Madrid summit, hope to be rncluded m thc scc-
ond round of accession talks Hou'cver rt is drf-
ficult to foresee horv the Amcncan posrtron u-rll
devclop betrveen no\\' and thc next NATO
summit. It rvas interesting, durrng thc Polrtrcal
Commrttee's visit to the United Slates at the end
of March 1998, to note thc particular importancc
attached bv the National Securrty Council to
Bulgaria and FYROM, along rvith Slovenia and
Romanra, n'hereas no mcntron rr'as madc of Slo-
vakra A partrcularll'thorn1, lssue concerns se-
curitl, rn the Baltrc statcs, x'hich, having for
centuries belongcd to the Tsanst empire and
thcn, from 1939 to 1991, to the Soviet Union, arc
viervcd by' Russra as part of its oun sphere of
influcncc Hcrc agarn it is difficult to predrct hou'
thc US stance u'rll evolve Hou'er,er. prectselv in
thrs rcspcct, it clearlv emerged dunng the Politr-
cal Commrttcc's talks rn Washrngton that cxtcn-
slve rcglonal cooperatton mvolvtng the Scandr-
navran countries and Russia u'as considered to bc
particularll' rmportant for fostcrtng sccuntv
More gencralh', as regards the proccss of furthcr
NATO enlargement. there ls somc lntcrcstlng
rnformatron from Austrian sourcos to thc effect
that the Unrted States has cxprcsscd the rvrsh that
the nert round of enlargcment discussrons should
be led b1'Austna
7l NATO's enlargement pohc1, vis-a-vis the
ccntral and eastern Europcan states u'hich are
assoclatc partncrs of WEU has repercussions
u'hrch arc at least as far-reachrng for WEU's
oun cnlargement pohcl' as thel' are for that of thc
EU Thcre are a number of reasons for this The
first is that alhes have agreed to creatc a Euro-
pcan sccurity and defence identrh' v,tlhrn NATO.
of lr'hrch WEU is to be an essentral elcmcnt
Thrs means that WEU u'ill be evon more closell'
rntcrlockcd rvith NATO and u'rll almost take on
the character of a "NATO sub-sct" A sccond
reason, rvhrch rs closcly trcd in urth the first. rs
the fact that nobodl, is rvilling to call rnto ques-
tron the basic decrsron that thc mrlitary guarantcc
for the mutual assrstance clausc in Article V of
the modrfied Brusscls Treatl' should be provided
b1' NATO, although thrs clausc is only binding
for WEU mcmbcr statcs
72 This close hnk betu'een WEU and NATO
means that WEU can onlv acccpt as full mem-
bers those states whrch are, or ivill soon becomc,
srgnatones of the North Atlantrc Treat1,. Thrs
makes it diffrcult for WEU to avord drffcrcntra-
tron ln rts future pohcv u'rth regard to acccssron
candidates, desprtc the commrtmcnt rcaffrrmcd
bv Mrnrsters rn Erfurt to thc creation of a com-
mon European securrtY arca ln ri'hrch therc arc
no dn'iding lines
73 NATO's responsrbrlrtv for collcctive de-
fence. rvhrch rvas also rndrrcctll' confirmed by the
Treatv of Amsterdanl. rncans that full mcmber-
shrp of NATO rs an esscntral prerequisitc for full
membershrp of WEU. a fact u,hich does not
emerge from the \\/EU Dcclaration of December
l99l Thrs rn rtsclf should suffice to encourage
the WEU Councrl to rel'rerv the contents of that
Dcclaratron, Hou'cl'er there rs a more general
qucstion anslng rn thrs connection. u'hrch rs
u'hether. rvrth thc cntn'rnto force of the Treatl' of
Amstcrdam. the Declaratron is strll vahd at all
74 In Recommendatron 611:0 thc Assembll'
made a number of proposals to thc Councrl.
rvhich thc lattcr drd not endorse, for rc'r,rsrng rts
enlargement pohcr'' A x'rdelv hcld r,rcrv rs that
WEU cannot srmph' be a consolatron prrze for
those countries u'hrch arc rcfuscd cntn' into
NATO But thrs rs not the rcal rssuc The u'hole
process of opcnrng up thc Euro-Atlantrc struc-
tures rs a d\namrc onc ln rihrch WEU is much
too trmrdll' rnvolvcd Thc task of exporting sta-
brlrt,v and secuntv rs not oulv the rcsponsibrlrtl'of
NATO and the Europcan Unron WEU should
consrder morc closch' the contnbutron lt can
make to promotrng and facrlrtatrng thrs process
and to prevcntlng a sccunt\ \'acuum from sefting
rn rn partrcularlv sensrtrre rcglons
7 5 . Thc drfferent eniargement policres of
NATO and the EU have created thc follori'rng
srtuatron none of the Baltrc states has becn rn-
vited to jorn NATO Hou'ever. one mrght u'ell
har.'c cxpected an exphcrt reference at the Madnd
summrt to the Baltrc state uhrch has madc great
progress tou'ards fulfilhng the crrtcna for acces-
sron to NATO. namclv Llthuanta. Thc EU on thc
other hand has selected onc of thcm 
- 
Estonta 
-
to start accessron talks Thts uncqual treatment
cannot hclp but havc an tmpact on the solidarrtr
of the Baltrc states u'hrch u'c knou' it ts the atm
of Russran pohcl to thu'art It cmerged clearll'
"'Ad"pt.d on 3 June I 997 on the basts of the report
submrttcd b1' Mr Urbarn on behalf of the Polrtrcal
Comnrittcc (Assembll' Documcnt I 565).
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once again from a Gorman-Russran semrnar held
rn Decembcr 1997, that the Baltrc statcs' lnter-
ests in NATO membership cannot bc rcconcrled
urth those of Russra An enlargcment of NATO
to include Estonia, Latvra and Lrthuanra, but also
Frnland. u'ould be percerved b1' Russia as a sc-
cunh' thrcatt'. A generalll' recognised basic free-
dom is that of choosrng one's alliances, but Rus-
sra is not prepared to grant that freedom to thc
Baltrc states On the other hand, both NATO
and thc Baltrc states have hitherto rejected all
Russran proposals for a common security guar-
antee for thc Baltrc reglon rvith Russian particr-
patlon. in the nature of a condominium Thus the
problem of thc sccunt)' of the Baltic states re-
marns unsolvcd It could cven bc aggravated in a
xav u'hrch u'ould bc even more detrimental to
thcrr rnterests, rf the "Unron" bctwccn Russra and
Belarus u'ere to lead to thc mrlrtan' control of
Belarus by Moscou'. Hou'ever. the Charter of
Partnershrp signed betu'een the Unitcd States and
the Baltrc states on 16 Januan' 1998 provrdes
them ivith important psvchologrcal support Onc
should not underestimate the polrtrcal importancc
of the fact that, rn srgning thrs Charter, thc
Unrted States u.as demonstratmg rts fundamental
rntcrest rn the rndependence, sovereigntv, territo-
nal integntl' and securrtv of these three states
and rts support for therr efforts to achieve NATO
membershrp. evcn though thrs agrcement does not
contaln anv formal security'guarantees It u'ould
rn anv c!'cnt sccm that this Charter is viewed in a
most posrtrve fashron by thc Baltic states them-
seh,es. although thel' u'ould also like to see a
strongcr cornmltment rn thrs respect on the part
ofthe Europcans"
76. As rcgards the othcr assocrate partners of
WEU. the secuntv srtuation of Bulgana and Slo-
vakia rs of partrcular lnterest Nerther of these
countrres has been exphcitly' mcntroned b1,
NATO in connectron rvrth therr possiblc acccs-
sron, u,hereas Romania and Slovcnra have at
least been named as possrble candrdates rn 1999
Thc ma-;or polrtrcal changes in Bulgarra that fol-
lorved rn the u,ake of the Aprrl 1997 electrons
have considcrabll' rmproved Bulgarra's chances
of accessron to NATO Thc same is true of this
i] Arl.^le b1' Lothar Rirhl rn the i\'eue Zurcher
Zettung. l3 December 1997.
" Inten're'*' u,rth thc Estonian Prcsident published
on ll February 1998 in thc A'eue Zurcher Zertung.
country,'s prospccts for EU membcrshrp, al-
though rt is strll onll' at thc begrnnrng of rts ef-
forts to overcome its gravc cconomlc cnsls
7l Slovakia's situatron rs somqvhat different
This country"s democratrc deficit rn a number of
arcas drau's particular crrticism from the Wcst
Although it is among the states foreseen for par-
trcipatron in the second round of EU accession
talks, rt is no longer mentioned in connection
rirth NATO enlargcment. The excesses of the
rntemal polrtrcal po\\'er struggle betrveen former
Presrdent Kovac and Prrme Minister Meciar, the
latter's st1'lc of government together with a whole
senes of constitutronal rrregularities, in connec-
tron for example u'rth the referendum on NATO
membershrp, the nghts of thc oppositron partres
and the division of pou'cr bctu,ccn the executn'e
and legrslature have. u'ithout a doubt. contributed
to the West's largelv negatrvc prcture of Slova-
kra Thrs u'as u-hy it rvas rmportant to your
Rapporteur, during his vrsrt to Slovakra, to hold
detarled talks ri,ith rcpresentatrves of the Slovak
Govemment, Parliament and polrtrcal partles,
during uhrch these problems \\'ere openly dis-
cussed
78 One sometrmes has the rmpresslon, as far
as Slovakra rs concerned. that the West tends to
Iook at rts !'en'real deficrencres through a magnl-
fi'rng glass. u'hereas lt rs more prepared in the
case of othcr countries to turn a blind e1'e. Scant
credrt rs grvcn to Slol'akra for rts astonishrng
success rn stabrhsrng and developrng its econom)'
m splte of thc extremell' drfficult crrcumstances
rn uhich rt started out lts armcd forces arc a
malor stabilising factor and arc hrghlv respected,
rncludrng by NATO The Rapporteur garned the
lmpressron that Slovakra's cfforts. aftcr centurres
of forergn domrnatron, to presen'c rts own rdcn-
tlt\', are not vieu,ed ven' favourabll rn some clr-
cles. particularly' rn the Unrted States. not least
because Slovakra, unlike other former communrst
states, endeavours to limit the florr' of foreign
caprtal rnto the countrl' Nonetheless, all the
polrtrcal authoritres u'rth s'hom I'our Rapportcur
held drscussions left no doubt at all rn hrs mrnd
that thcre rs a clear majoritl, in Slovakia rn
favour of.;ornrng the Euro-Atlantrc structures.
79 For some of WEU's associate partner
states rt rs parucularly important from the pornt
of vren' of thcrr rnternal polrtrcal situation that
thev should receive clearcr signals that they are
18
DOCUMENT I602
not golng to be excluded from mernbership of thc
Euro-Atlantic structures to rvliich thc1, asprre. In
thrs respect, WEU should offer all assocratc
partner states more than just practrcal arrange-
ments for enhancing their partrcipatron rn Peters-
berg missrons. One should remember that the
assocrate partner status that WEU Mrnisters
granted to ccntral and eastern European states in
May 1994 *'as hnked u'rth certain uell-defined
objectrvcs.
"WEU is launching this major political
rnrtiatrvc rn thc context of the developing
hnks betrveen these States and European
lnstltutlons, notably through Europe
Agreements This u,ill constitute a con-
crete contrrbution by' WEIJ tou'ards pre-
panng these States for their rntegration
and eventual acccssion to thc European
Union, opening up in turn the perspective
of membership of WEUzt''
80 The European Council decrded to launch
thc accession process rr th all ten associate part-
ner statcs srmultancoush'on 30 March 1998, at a
mcctrng u'ith the forergn affairs mrnrsters of the
states concerned Initially. concrete negotrations
u'ill be confined to the Czech Repubhc, Estonia,
Hungarl'. Poland and Slovenia, but in parallel
preparatlons u'rll bc speeded up for the negotia-
tions u'rth thc fir,c rcmalnlng statcs. The objec-
tive of assocrato partncr status as pursued by the
WEU Councrl. namelv to prcpare the states con-
cerned for Europcan Unron membcrshrp, is thus
attained WEU should drau' thc logical conclu-
stons and full1' rnvolvc all assocrate partners rn
those of rts actr\'ltles not falling under the mutual
assrstance clause.
8l Hou'ever, this must be done rn a legallv
bindrng fashion Thrs does not mle out the pos-
sibrlrtr'. srmilar to u'hat rvas done in Kirchberg,
of negotiating arrangements enabling the neu'
status to have rmmedrate effect on a provisional
basis, although formalh, rt u'ould only enter into
force once the state concerned had effectively
lorned the European Unron, At the same trme ne-
gotiatrons could start riith thc Czech Repubhc,
Hungary and Poland on their accession to the
modified Brussels Treaty, srnce they rvill be
- f".nU..g Declaratron of 9 May 1994 (Assembly
Document I422)
Jornlng not only'thc EU but also, at the latcst rn
1999, NATO.
82 Such a proccdure, horvever, also requires
nov, legally' binding arrangements to be drau-n
up u'rth rcgard to the status of the present asso-
ciatc member and observer states of WEU The
Amsterdam Treatl' gave the latter the right to
particrpate full1'and on an equal footing in WEU
plannrng and decisron-takrng for operailons con-
ducted by' WEU at the request of the European
Unron Thcsc arrangements. ri'hich already apply
on a provrsronal basis, grve observer states the
same rights as full mcmbcrs in one of the key
areas of WEU actn,ity, In thrs new legal situa-
tion. the difference betx,cen therr rights and those
of the assoclate membcr countrres rs scarcelv
perceptrble
83 In their Declaration of 22 luly 1997, WEU
Ministers rccalled that assocrate membcrs are
entitled to partlclpate, on an equal footrng u'rth
full members, m operations to u'hrch thcl' con-
tribute, as lvell as in the relevant exercrses and
planning But u'hat is meant by "contribute"')
Accordrng to the arrangement adopted on 25
Novembcr 199224 rn Rome. rt means makrng
military forces avarlable But does thrs arrange-
ment apply to operatrons for u'hich the EU avarls
itself of WEU? If rt does, horv can the EU
Councrl's gcneral compctcnce to set guidehnes
appll to associatc membcrs of WEU rvhich are
not membcrs of thc Europcan Union?
84. What is the drfferencc betu'een the rrghts
en;o1'ed by'obsen,er statcs u'rth regard to the de-
crsion-takmg process for operatrons carrrcd out
bv WEU at the behest of the EU. and those
x'hich are referred to rn Sectron C 14 of the
Declaratron of 22 Jil1'? The drffercnccs betu'een
thc nghts of associate members, obscrvcrs and
associate partners are beginning to bccomc so
blurred that one rvonders u,hether rt realll' makcs
sensc any more for them to belong to three drffer-
ent categoncs One possrble solution for the
future u'ould be to divide states partlcrpatrng in
WEU activrtres into tu'o categones The first
rvould be for full member states u'hich are signa-
torics of the modrfied Brussels Treaty and its
protocols WEU should estabhsh the follou'rng
minrmum crlterla for states to qualifu to be in-
vited to accedc to thc modrfied Brussels Treaty:
' 
etr..nU\, Document 1351.
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(a) All states urth u'hrch thc Europcan
Union has started accesslon ncgotratlons
and lvhrch have srgncd acccssion protocols
ir,rth the Atlantrc Alhancc. uould bc rn-
vrted to acccdc to WEU on tcrms to be
agrced in accordancc u'rth Artrclc IX of
the modificd Brusscls Treatr'. The states
conccrned at prcsent are the Czech
Repubhc, Hungary and Poland.
(b) The mlnlmum prcrequisrte for acces-
sron bv European NATO states to the
WEU Treatl should be their admission to
the second prllar of the European Uruon.
In thc frameu'ork of the arrangements to
be u,orked out betu'ccn WEU and thc
European Unron for cnhanced coopcration
betu'een the tu'o organlsatrons. rn applica-
tron of Arrrcle 17 of the TEU (Artrcle J 7
of the Amsterdam Treatl'). WEU member
states should make specral representatrons
to the European Unron to cnsure that those
WEU assocratc membcrs u'hich so u'ish
are granted extensrve rrghts to pa(rcrpate
rn the CFSP. Oncc thcsc condrtrons have
bccn mct, ln agrccmcnt urth thc Europcan
Unron. all European mcmber states of
NATO rvhrch up untrl norv have been as-
soclatc mcmbcrs rn WEU could also be
rnvrtcd to acccde to WEU under condrtrons
to bc uorkcd out rn accordance u'rth
-A.rtrcle XI of the modrfied Brussels Treaty
The states concemed in this case are Ice-
land. Norua1 and Turkev
(c) Of the fir'e obsen'er states rn WEU.
Dcnmark, as a member both of NATO and
the EU. rs the onlr'one u'hrch alrcadv ful-
fils the condrtrons for acccdrng to thc
modrfied Brussels Trcatr' \\4rcthcr Den-
mark submtts such a request to WEU urll,
hou'cvcr. depcnd on thc drrcctron taken b1'
mternal politrcal drscussrons rn thc coun-
tn' Once thcl' comply'rvith the abovemen-
troncd cntena, thc states named m para-
graphs (a) to (c) could lorn the first cate-
gory'of full WEU mcmbers.
85 In somc WEU observcr statcs that have a
tradrtron of ncutralrtr', a hvel1, internal debate rs
undcr rvav on secuntv and defence pohcy' and,
more specrficallr', on the possibilitl, of grvrng up
neutralrtv rn favour of possrble accessron rn due
course to NATO and,/or WEU Austria rs among
the countrres rn rvhich the debate rs particularlr,'
vigorous. Your Rapporteur had an opportunrty'
on l6 Aprrl 1998 to talk urth leadrng mcmbers of
thc Austnan Govcrnment, Parhament and polrtr-
cal partres On the same da1, the Austrran Parl-
iament held an emergcncy dcbatc on Austna's
future secuntv polcl'
86 Although the goveming coalrtron has so
far been unable to agrce on the content of a re-
port to bc submrttcd to Parliament, setting out
secuntv and defence pohcl'options, all the repre-
scntatn,es vour Rapporteur talked to made rt
clear that Austrrans are of the unanimous vicw
that onlv thcl' themselves can settle the rssue of
changrng the countn"s pohcl' of neutrality Re-
gardrng the questron of Austna's possrble acces-
slon to NATO and./or WEU. some rntercstrng
shades of oprnron emerged from all the Rap-
porteur's discussions w'rth polrtrcal partv repre-
sentatives The FPO seems to bc thc onll'partv
rvhrch unreservediv supports NATO mcmber-
shrp, u'hereas rt is critrcal of the European Unron
and of the rdea of a merger bctu'ecn the EU and
WEU. Rather, it sees WEU membershrp as fol-
loiiing on from NATO membershrp
8'7 Most of thc other parties favour an ap-
proach that begrns u'rth Europe In the OVP. for
cxample. Austrra's medrum-term membership of
WEU rs sccn as a stepprng-stone to its long-term
membershrp of NATO In the SPO, there rs a
prcfercncc for close cooperation u,rth NATO
rathcr than mcmbershrp. WEU's mtegratlon ln
thc EU rs favoured and there ls a vre\\'that ac-
ccssion to WEU could be consrdered rf the polrtr-
cal dccrsions \\'erc taken bv the Europcan Unron
or on the basrs of a mandatc from the Unrted Na-
tlons. It mrght agree to a mutual assistancc
clause rn the EU Treatr'. rf the mutual assrstancc
obhgatron pertained not to rndrvrdual states but
to the territon' of the European Unron The onlv
partv to adl'ocate Austna's accessron to WEU
riithout jornrng NATO rs the Lrberal Forum
Unfortunatell' l'our Rapporteur u'as unable to
talk urth members of the Green Partl', but it
*'ould appear to bc thc onlv one to relect both
NATO and WEU niembcrship
88 It rs uscful to bear rn mind, in order to un-
derstand thc rntcrnal polrtrcal debate in Austrra.
that rn the coalrtron agreement betu'een thc gov-
cming partres. full membership of WEU figurcs
among the securrtl' pohcl' optrons but not mem-
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bershrp of NATO. Your Rapporteur lvas rn-
formed dunng hrs vrsit to Austna that. among
other things, thc North Atlantrc Assembll, has
proposed to the delegations of Austna. Frnland
and Sweden that they convert their observer
status rnto one of assocratc membership. The
Austnan Parliament has not yet reached a deci-
sron on this proposal.
89. The internal political debate rn Austria
shows that while the close link betuecn the EU
and WEU poses a problem for some accession
candidates, as rve have seen earlier on rn the case
of Turkev, certain potential candrdates for WEU
membership, such as Austria, have more of a
problem rvith the close linkage bets'een WEU
and NATO, rvhich has led to NATO mcmbership
becoming a tacit condrtron for accessron to
WEU In his report on the eastern drmcnsron of
European securitr,25, your Rapporteur has al-
readv drscussed the issues that arise rf enlarge-
ment of the Euro-Atlantrc structures ls seen as a
dynamic process in whrch WEU membershrp rs
allorved to precede NATO membership in cases
rvhere the pnncrple of;oinrng NATO is not called
rnto questron There are ccrtainly'risks attached
to a more flexible enlargement policv of this krnd
on the part of WEU One should. houever, check
on a case-by-case basis u'hether or not the
advantages outrvergh the nsks.
90 The remarnrng EU states that have chosen
observer status rn WEU and rvhrch do not rvish
to;orn the Atlantrc Alliance, have had therr status
and nghts in WEU enhanced to such a degree
through Artrcle 17 of the TEU (Artrcle J 7 of the
Amsterdam Treatl) and through thc WEU deci-
sions of 22 Julv and l8 November 1997. that the
term ''observer'' rs no longcr an appropnatc dcs-
rgnatron. In the interests of legal certainty'. WEU
should see to lt that these enhanced particrpatron
possibrlrtres for obsen,er states, ivhich up untrl
norv have to some extent been based on decrsions
by the Councrl that could not bc subjected to
parliamentary scrutrny, arc given a legal basis
that is as extensrve as possible and u'hich should
rnclude the possibrlity of accession to the Agree-
ment of lI May 1955 on the status of WEU, the
text of rvhrch u'ould need to be amended accord-
rngly' Another possrbilrty ri'ould be to conclude a
neu' Agreement. Thc Assembly, horvcver, should
carry out rts oun studv to see whether the new
arrangcments governrng the nghts of obscrver
states affect the status of their parhamentary
delegations rn the WEU Assembll,.
91. A srmrlar arrangement should be negotr-
ated wrth the remarning scven associate partner
states of WEU, partrcularly in view of the fact
that the prrncrple of their accession to the Euro-
pean Union has already been agreed and that the
European Commrssron has attested that thel'
fulfil the condrtrons for participation in the
CFSP. If such a conccpt rvere to be adopted,
there rvould in the futurc be only two categories
of WEU states' fulI members and associate
members. Countries u,rth a tradition of ncutralitl,
should, holever, be free to formallv marntarn
their "observer" status for as long as thcy may
wish to do so for mternal pohtrcal reasons.
IV Supporting measures required
to strengthen stahility and security
in a wider Europe
92 The enhancement of the status of assoclate
partner states proposed in this report strll does
not mean anv securi6, guarantee for the countrres
concemed WEU carurot offer such a guarantee
to non-NATO member states. as long as the
practical implemcntatron of Artrclc V of the
modrfied Brussels Trcaty remains a mattcr for
NATO. Hence, rn ordcr to further increase se-
cuntv and stabrlitl,rn ccntral and eastern Europe,
a u'hole series of supportrng measures arc neces-
sar), One such msasure rs the promotron of re-
gional cooperatlon, partrcularlv rn thc Baltrc Sea
area, rnvolvmg Denmark, Frnland and Su'eden,
and cooperation u'rthln the framervork of the
Councrl of the Balttc Sea Statcs rvith the partrcr-
pation of Russia Other cxamples of regronal co-
operation are the Baltic Councrl and. to thc
north, thc Barents Sea Coopcratron Councrl, rn
the centre, thc Central European Free Trade
Area, the Ccntral European Inrtrative and coop-
eration among the Vrsegrad statcs and to the
south. the Black Sea Economic Cooperatron
Frnally, the signrficance of the various forms of
bilateral coopcration should not bc underestr-
mated.
93 A further rmportant measure rs to step up
polrtrcal dialogue and practrcal cooperatron urth
the Russian Federation lndeed, this questron rs
addresscd specificalll' rn the report submrtted bv
2l
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our colleague Mr Martincz In parallel, relations
rvith Ukrarne must be developed and consider-
ably more attcntion should be pard than has been
the case in the past to developments rn Belarus
94. Frnally, wc should not forgct the need to
further strengthen cooperatlon u'ith the OSCE
The Erfurt Dcclaratron devotcs only one rela-
tively short paragraph to thc role of the OSCE
and WEU should give more practrcal effect to the
intention stated there of supporting the OSCE rn
its crrsis-management tasks. This organrsalon
can play an important rolc in creating a pan-
European securitl'modcl, rf there is agreemcnt on
the fact that it can be complementary to such
collectrve defence organlsatlons as NATO and
WEU rn contributing to strengthening securrty in
Europe Hou'ever, a hrerarchical rankrng of
these organisatlons beneath the OSCE, as advo-
catcd by countries hke Russia, is not acceptable.
Cooperation among all OSCE mcmbers in a cli-
mate of trust could be considerabll, strengthened
rf thc OSCE ucre to devote rtself prrmanly to all
actrvltres conccmrng earl1, rvarning, cnsis prev-
entron and conflrct settlement. Ncvertheless, one
must bear rn mrnd that all aspccts of pan-Euro-
pean cooperatron which arc not directlv related to
secunt)' are already' covered todal' b1, the Council
of Europc
V. Conclusions
95 In sprte of all the reslstance, the rcars of
drfficultics rn gettrng off thc ground and after
har,'rng been u'ntten off ttmc and agarn, WEU rs
no\\'on the u'av to becomrng an important plal,er
and a factor to bc reckoned rvith in the ficld of
cnsls management and dcfence For thc moment
however, u'hat rs still lacking on the part of many
European politicians and decisron-makers is thc
confidence in this Organrsatron that would enable
rt to be granted greater responsibrlrtres in crisrs
srtuatrons In some cases they also lack the po-
lrtical urll to avail themselves of WEU.
96. It u,ould, hon,ever, bc irresponsible to
claim that WEU can onlv bccome credible by
provlng rts operatronal capabilrty in a real cnsrs
situalon It does not requirc a crisis to establish
credrbrlity. The real test case is for a widcr
Europc to be united in rts security and defcnce
pohcf in a climate of peacc This goal has not
y,et been reached, but WEU at 28, the precursor
of a u'rder securrty and defence Europc, has
taken up the challengc and rs u,ell on thc way to
meetrng it The numerous dtffrcultres that lie
bcfore it grven the manv drsparitres that still exist
bctrveen the situatrons of the 28 WEU natrons
have been set out once agaln rn this report
97 It coniains an assessment of the situatron
and proposes a number of suggestrons which rt is
hoped rvill make a constructive contribution to
ensuring that the efforts under rral' to achieve
greatcr homogeneitlr among the 28 WEU natrons,
rvrth a vre*'to buildrng a united sccurity and dc-
fence Europe. and at the same time to make
WEU a credrble tool for crisrs management, arc
crouned u'rth success The political condrtions
for achieving such a goal are currentlv vcry
favourable and actron should thereforc be taken
u'rthout delay
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{PPENDIX
Extracts from the modified Brussels Treaty,
the Amsterdam Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty
Article WII.3 of the modified Brussels Treaty
At the request of any of the High Contracting Parties the Council shall be immediately convened in
order to permit Them to consult rvith regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in
whatever area this threat should arrse, or a danger to economic stability
Article J.6 of the Amsterdam Treaty
Member states shall tnform and consult one another rvithin the Councrl on any matter of forergn and
security pohcy of general intercst in order to ensure that the Unron's influence rs exerted as effectivel'
as possible by means ofconcerted and convergent actlon.
Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty
The Parties rvill consult together x'hcnever, rn the opinron of any of them, the terntonal integritl',
politrcal rndependence or security of any of the Parties rs threatened.
23
TMPBTMERIE O elrNqoNNAISE
Rue Edouard-Beln : 2" trrmestre 1998
No d'ordre :4l02l
PRINTED IN FRANCE
